The question as to whether the DIFC Court has the power to issue orders in support of non DIFC proceedings remains controversial, and the last twelve months have seen several significant developments. On 26 November 2024, the DIFC Court of Appeal delivered judgment in Carmon[1], overturning Sandra Holding.[2] This was then followed by the promulgation of the new DIFC Courts Law (the 2025 Law)[3] and recent months have seen four significant decisions under the new legislation: Trafigura[4], Olympio[5], Techteryx[6] and Enforcement Case[7] .
When read in isolation these decisions can seem inconsistent, and this article argues that this inconsistency stems from the fact that the 2025 Law does not codify the decision in Carmon, leaving several questions unresolved. However, by drawing on the connection between (i) the DIFC’s jurisdiction to grant injunctions in aid of foreign proceedings and (ii) the DIFC’s conduit jurisdiction, it is possible to identify a principled emerging jurisprudence.
While it is too early to tell, it seems that the DIFC Courts are beginning to distinguish orders in support of “foreign proceedings” from those issued in support of proceedings issued in the Dubai Courts.
The Common Law Position
Can a court issue an injunction in support of foreign proceedings? Historically, the view across the common law world was that an injunction was ancillary to a cause of action. In The Siskina[8] the House of Lords, in part relying on the Judicature Act, held that an injunction could only be granted if it is “part of the substantive relief to which the plaintiff’s cause of action entitles him”. In that case, the Court found that an injunction could not be granted in the absence of substantive proceedings giving rise to a recognisable cause of action in England.
However, in recent decades this proposition has been gradually eroded by both statutory and common law developments in England[9]. To name the most significant:
- Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 recognised that the English Courts have the power to grant an injunction against persons whether or not they are present in the jurisdiction[10];
- Section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 gave the English Courts power to grant an injunction in support of certain foreign proceedings, including those commenced or about to be commenced in a contracting state of an international treaty relating to judicial cooperation to which the United Kingdom is a party [11];
- In Stewart Chartering Ltd v. C&O Managements[12] Goff J, as he then was, recognised that a freezing order could be granted or maintained post judgment (i.e. after a cause of action had extinguished);
- In TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra[13] the High Court granted an injunction against a third party which allegedly held assets beneficially owned by the defendant (i.e. a non-cause of action defendant).This judgment was subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal inMercantile Group (Europe) AG v. Aiyela[14].
These historical developments are thoroughly analysed in the decision of the Privy Council in Broad Idea v. Convoy[15]. Here Leggatt JSC formally rejected the reasoning in The Siskina, endorsed the “enforcement principle” that was articulated in Lord Nicholls’s dissenting judgment in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck[16] and outlined the applicable test to the granting of a freezing order as follows:
“In summary, a court with equitable and/or statutory jurisdiction to grant injunctions where it is just and convenient to do so has power – and it accords with principle and good practice – to grant a freezing injunction against a party (the respondent) over whom the court has personal jurisdiction provided that:
- (i) the applicant has already been granted or has a good arguable case for being granted a judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money that is or will be enforceable through the process of the court;
- (ii) the respondent holds assets (or, as discussed below, is liable to take steps other than in the ordinary course of business which will reduce the value of assets) against which such a judgment could be enforced; and
- (iii) there is a real risk that, unless the injunction is granted, the respondent will deal with such assets (or take steps which make them less valuable) other than in the ordinary course of business with the result that the availability or value of the assets is impaired and the judgment is left unsatisfied.
Although other factors are potentially relevant to the exercise of the discretion whether to grant a freezing injunction, there are no other relevant restrictions on the availability in principle of the remedy. In particular:
- There is no requirement that the judgment should be a judgment of the domestic court – the principle applies equally to a foreign judgment or other award capable of enforcement in the same way as a judgment of the domestic court using the court’s enforcement powers.
- Although it is the usual situation, there is no requirement that the judgment should be a judgment against the respondent.
- There is no requirement that proceedings in which the judgment is sought should yet have been commenced nor that a right to bring such proceedings should yet have arisen: it is enough that the court can be satisfied with a sufficient degree of certainty that a right to bring proceedings will arise and that proceedings will be brought (whether in the domestic court or before another court or tribunal).”[17]
It is important to emphasise that Broad Idea, while endorsing the “enforcement principle”, did not jettison the requirement for personal jurisdiction to be a necessary condition to for the granting of a freezing order. On the facts of the case, proceedings were commenced against Dr Cho in Hong Kong, and it was argued that he was the ultimate beneficial owner of a BVI company. While the Privy Council found that a BVI Court could freeze the assets of the BVI company (over which it had personal jurisdiction), it was held to have no jurisdiction to grant a freezing order against Dr Cho personally.
Developments in the DIFC prior to Carmon
Prior to the decision in Carmon[18] and promulgation of the 2025 Law, it was understood that the DIFC Courts had no express statutory power to grant an injunction in support of foreign proceedings (i.e. there was no equivalent to section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982).
However, in a series of cases that culminated in Jones v. Jones[19], Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke found that Part 25.24(1) of the Rules of the DIFC Courts, which stated that that an injunction in support of foreign proceedings should be commenced using the Part 8 procedure, was a sufficient statutory basis for jurisdiction [20]. In that case, the assets in question were located in mainland Dubai, save for one asset which was in the DIFC [21], and the DIFC Court ultimately issued an injunction that applied to assets within the DIFC and outside the DIFC.
However, in Sandra Holding[22], the assertion that a rule of court could potentially confer jurisdiction on all parties worldwide was challenged. In that case four individuals from Kuwait were sued in Kuwait and an ancillary worldwide freezing injunction was granted by the DIFC Courts by Sir Jeremy Cooke. The four individuals had no connection to the DIFC and were not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. In a judgment dated 3 September 2023 the Court of Appeal overturned the worldwide freezing order and found that the “wording of RDC 25.24 provides a general power which the Court may exercise when granting an interim remedy in aid of foreign proceedings. The words used in that rule are not meant to confer jurisdiction .”[23]
It is important to emphasise that the four individual respondents did not argue that the DIFC Court could not issue in an injunction in support of foreign proceedings per se, just that personal jurisdiction remained a necessary condition. It was conceded that if a DIFC company was sued in a foreign jurisdiction then the DIFC Courts could freeze its assets pending the prospective enforcement of the foreign judgment. In such circumstances, as per Broad Idea, the DIFC Court would have personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
Conduit Enforcement
Before turning to the decision in Carmon, it is important to briefly touch on the concept of conduit enforcement. The constitutional architecture of the DIFC envisions that its judgments and orders will be readily enforceable in wider Dubai. Indeed, this this was expressly set out in the Judicial Authority Law[24] and has formed a cornerstone of DIFC jurisprudence.
Beginning in the mid-2010s, legal practitioners, recognising that the DIFC Courts had a reputation for being arbitration friendly, sought recognition of foreign arbitral awards in the DIFC not to enforce against assets in the DIFC, but so as to bring the DIFC recognition orders to the Dubai Courts and to enforce against assets in wider Dubai. In other words, the DIFC was used as a “conduit” to reach assets in non DIFC Dubai. While this practice was affirmed by the DIFC Court of Appeal[25], it led to a series of jurisdictional disputes with the Dubai Courts and ultimately the establishment of the Joint Judicial Committee pursuant to Dubai Decree No. (19) of 2016. The Joint Judicial Committee was recently reconstituted as the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal pursuant to Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024.
In Sandra Holding, the claimant argued that if it obtained a judgment in Kuwait, it could have that judgment recognised in the DIFC and subsequently enforced in Dubai through the DIFC’s conduit jurisdiction. It followed that pursuant to the “enforcement principle”, it was legitimate for the DIFC Court to pre-emptively freeze the respondents’ assets in non DIFC Dubai. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal which found that the DIFC Court “does not have any statutory basis to assume jurisdiction by extending the conduit jurisdiction principle to matters which are not within the scope of the DIFC Court.” [26] It follows that prospective conduit enforcement of a foreign judgment could not ground the DIFC’s jurisdiction.
The Carmon Decision
Less than one year after the DIFC’s decision in Sandra Holding, Justice Wayne Martin, as he then was, refused to grant the freezing order sought, but gave the claimant in Carmon permission to appeal on numerous grounds, including whether the decision in Sandra Holding was wrong in principle. In Carmon, the claimant was an Angolan company and it suspected that its former employee, the respondent, had engaged in wrongdoing. The respondent had primarily conducted business in Hong Kong and as such, the claimant commenced proceedings against him in that jurisdiction. The claimant subsequently sought and obtained a freezing order against him from the Hong Kong courts and in the course of mandatory asset disclosure, it transpired that the respondent had made transfers to a non DIFC Dubai bank. The claimant therefore sought a worldwide freezing order from the DIFC Courts.
The Court of Appeal overturned this decision of Justice Wayne Martin on the ground that Sandra Holding was wrong in principle. According to the judgment of the Court of Appeal:
“If a defendant in proceedings in a foreign court, whose judgment could be enforced in the DIFC, were to dissipate its assets to defeat execution of an apprehended judgment in the foreign jurisdiction and in the other jurisdictions in which the foreign judgment might be enforced, that would be a step which would render the jurisdiction and powers of an enforcing court nugatory.”[27]
It follows that because the claimant could obtain a Hong Kong judgment and because that judgment could be enforced in non DIFC Dubai through the DIFC’s conduit jurisdiction, it was legitimate for the DIFC Courts to freeze assets in Dubai (in this case, a bank account with Emirates NBD). Of course, the Court of Appeal was careful to limit the scope of the power to grant worldwide freezing order. According to the judgment:
“There is, of course, always a question of discretion as to whether a freezing order should be granted in such a case and, if so, the scope of the order. In many cases it would be expected that such a freezing order would be limited to assets within Dubai. While there is power to make a WFO, the question of discretion — whether such an order should be made — is one which requires careful consideration.”[28]
Following Carmon, the DIFC Court has the jurisdiction and the power to grant a freezing injunction in support of foreign proceedings as long as there are assets in the Emirate of Dubai against which the prospective foreign judgment can be enforced using some process of the DIFC Courts. Of course, Carmon leaves several issues unresolved including the question as to whether an injunction could be granted in respect of property in other emirates of the UAE. After all, a foreign judgment could be taken to the DIFC Court, and then to the Dubai Courts and then from there to other emirates. Would the potential of double conduit enforcement be sufficient to ground the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts?
Furthermore, in linking the scope of freezing order relief to the location of assets, the DIFC Court has arguably turned what is an in personam remedy to an in rem remedy. In this respect, all authorities establish that a freezing order affects assets worldwide simply because a respondent is subject to the court’s in personam jurisdiction [29]. In other words, a freezing order affects a party personally, and it is not an attachment of assets.
The 2025 Law
Following the handing down of the judgment in Carmon, Dubai Law No. (2) of 2025 Concerning Dubai International Financial Centre Courts was promulgated on 3 March 2025 (the 2025 Law). Article 15 provides:
“The DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for interim or precautionary measures related to the following . . .
4. Applications, claims, or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside of the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC.”
Article 31 further provides:
“Subject to Article (29) of this Law, the Enforcement Judge shall have jurisdiction over: . .
4. The enforcement of judgments and judicial decisions affixed with the executory formula issued by local or foreign courts, including the Dubai Courts, as well as interim and precautionary orders and decisions issued by local and foreign courts, including the Dubai Courts, and arbitral tribunals, inside the DIFC, and in accordance with the Rules of the Courts.”
Article 15(4) does not “codify” the Carmon judgment. It simply recognises expressly in statute what was already implicitly recognises in RDC 25.24: the DIFC Courts can grant injunctions in support of foreign proceedings. However, the language “within the DIFC” in Article 15(4) and “inside the DIFC” in Article 31(4) raises a series of questions. In one respect, it could be argued that the provisions expressly restrict the granting of interim relief in support of foreign proceedings or the enforcement of foreign judgments to assets within the territory of the DIFC – thus directly overruling Carmon.
The Recent Case Law
With this background in mind, the four recent cases decided under the new legislation can be examined.
InTrafigura[30] the claimant commenced proceedings in England and sought a UAE wide freezing order against the respondents, who were husband and wife. While the husband and wife were resident in Dubai, only the husband was a party to the English proceedings.
At first instance H.E. Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani refused to grant the freezing order sought. He reasoned that the 2025 Law limited the scope of freezing orders in support of foreign proceedings to assets within the territorial jurisdiction of the DIFC – effectively overturning Carmon. However, this decision was overturned on appeal with the Court of Appeal issuing two separate judgments: one on an ex parte basis[31] and another following an inter partes hearing [32].
The Court of Appeal found that the reasoning in Carmon survived the 2025 Law and that having regard to “the legislative history and the public policy considerations enunciated in Carmon it would be surprising in the extreme that an inexplicable and substantial narrowing of the Court’s jurisdiction and powers was to be affected”[33] by its terms. In this respect, the appellant had argued that “[t]he Court was not being asked to make in rem orders over assets outside the DIFC. The orders sought would be a precautionary measure sought “within the DIFC” for the purposes of Article 15(4).”[34] In other words, the term “within the DIFC” simply referred to orders made by the DIFC Court.
The reasoning in Trafigura[35] was subsequently followed by the Digital Economy Court in Techteryx [36]. Here the claimant, a BVI company, commenced proceedings in Hong Kong and then sought an ancillary freezing order in the DIFC against the respondent, a non DIFC Dubai company, and three non DIFC Dubai banks. Justice Michael Black KC granted the freezing order sought on the basis that there was a good arguable case of the Hong Kong judgment being enforced through a process of the DIFC Court. In analysing Article 15(4) of the 2025 Law, Justice Black stated:
“The words “within the DIFC” cannot mean that the precautionary measures are confined to assets within the DIFC, that would be to abolish the Court’s jurisdiction to grant WFOs by a side-swipe. The words are clearly in contradistinction to “outside the DIFC” and reflect the words of the preceding sub- article which speaks of “applications and claims that fall within the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts”. The words must mean seeking suitable precautionary measures within the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts which includes the enforcement of foreign judgments (Article 31(4) of the Court Law).”[37]
The judge continued by stating that:
“Article 15(4) was intended to make plain and give a firm statutory basis to that which had hitherto had to be inferred from the combination of the Court’s power to recognise and enforce foreign judgments and its power to grant interim remedies . .
It follows that there is a requirement that the assets enjoined should be available to satisfy a judgment through some process of enforcement in the DIFC Courts.”[38]
Justice Black concluded by stating:
“In my judgment the policy embodied in the Enforcement Principle means that one must look beyond the immediate relief claimed in the HK proceedings. It is thus possible, to paraphrase Lord Leggatt [in Broad Idea], there is no difference in principle between a case where a freezing injunction is sought in anticipation of a future judgment of the DIFC Court in substantive proceedings brought in the DIFC and a future judgment of the DIFC Court obtained in an action brought to enforce a foreign judgment: in each case the Court must determine (1) whether there is a sufficient likelihood that a judgment enforceable through the process of the DIFC Courts will be obtained, and (2) a sufficient risk that without a freezing injunction execution of the judgment will be thwarted, to justify the grant of relief.”[39]
It follows that, according to the Techteryx judgment, the principles annunciated in Carmon have survived the 2025 Law. A party can obtain a freezing injunction in support of foreign proceeding from the DIFC Courts provided that it can identify a judgment that can be enforced through some process of the DIFC Court. Conduit enforcement against assets in non DIFC Dubai is an acceptable process of the Court. However, in Olympio[40] a different conclusion was reached by the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal. Here the claimant and defendant were non DIFC Dubai companies and the claimant obtained a non DIFC Dubai arbitral award against the respondent under the rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre and then sought recognition and enforcement of the award before the DIFC Courts. Once granted, the claimant then obtained a worldwide freezing order from the DIFC Courts prohibiting the defendant from dealing with its assets up to the value of the arbitral award. Faced with a freezing injunction, the defendant sought nullification of the arbitral award before the Dubai Courts and filed proceedings before the Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal, claiming that the Dubai Courts had jurisdiction in respect of enforcement of the arbitral award. The Conflict of Jurisdiction Tribunal agreed with the defendant, vacated the freezing order and ordered proceedings before the DIFC to cease. Given that the award was Dubai seated and the parties were not DIFC Establishments, there was no basis for the DIFC Courts to intervene. Furthermore, in Enforcement Case [41] ,the judgment creditor obtained a judgment from the Dubai Courts and sought to enforce it in the DIFC. While the judgment debtor had limited assets in the DIFC, the judgment creditor sought to take advantage of the RDC Part 50 procedure which allows judgment creditors to obtain information from debtors. While H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser found that the DIFC Courts had jurisdiction to enforce the Dubai Courts judgment, he held that any Part 50 Order must be “limited to the subject matter being in the DIFC [42] .”. This decision was based on a strict reading of Article 31(4) of the 2025 Law. The decisions in Olympio[43] and Enforcement Case[44] can be distinguished from those in Techteryx[45] and Trafigura[46] on the basis that the former concerned underlying Dubai rather than foreign proceedings. It can be assumed that the DIFC Court and the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal were reluctant to allow the litigants to avail of procedural remedies available before the DIFC Courts (i.e. freezing and information orders) which would not be readily available before the Dubai Courts. Going forward, this distinction between the “Dubai proceedings” and “foreign proceedings” will likely be maintained as the Conflicts of Jurisdiction will not allow the DIFC Court to be come any enforcement vehicle for orders of the Dubai Courts and Dubai seated arbitral awards. In contrast, the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal will have no say in jurisdictional disputes between the DIFC and foreign courts. While the 2025 Law does not codify the principles of the Carmon judgment, both the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance have recently affirmed that these principles continue to apply to the granting of freezing orders in support of foreign proceedings. However, the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal and the Enforcement Division of the DIFC Courts have recently pushed back on attempts by litigants to use the DIFC as a conduit to enhance the powers of the Dubai Courts. Arguably, we are starting to see the DIFC Courts distinguish between “foreign proceedings” and “Dubai proceedings” and it is an open question as to whether the DIFC Courts can grant a freezing order in support of foreign proceedings affecting assets outside of the Emirate of Dubai. [1] Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v. Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 [2] [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023). [3] Dubai Law No. (2) of 2025 Concerning Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (3 March 2025) [4] Trafigura PTE LTD (1) Trafigura India PTV LTD (2) v Prateek Gupta (1) Ginni Gupta (2) [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025). [5] Olympio v. Olwin [2025] ARB 024 (7 August 2025). See also the corresponding Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal decision (002/2025) dated 2 September 2025. [6] Techteryx Ltd v (1) Aria Commodities DMCC (2) Mashreq Bank PSC (3) Emirates Nbd Bank PJSC (4) Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank PJSC [2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025). [7] [2025] ENF 185 (25 November 2025). While the judgment has not been published on the DIFC website, the authors have reviewed an anonymized copy. [8] [1979] AC 210 at 256. [9] This is in contrast to the position in the United States, where the established position is that courts do not have authority to issue Mareva-type injunctions and that “ (Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999)). Perhaps ironically, the reasoning in Grupo Mexicano was that such injunctions constitute equitable (as opposed to statutory) remedy, and that equity jurisdiction of courts in the United States is limited to that which was exercised by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution and the (American) Judiciary Act of 1789. The Grupo Mexicano majority noted that “[t]he Mareva injunction has been recognized as a powerful tool for general creditors: indeed, it has been called the “nuclear weapo[n] of the law.” [..] it is indisputable that the English courts of equity did not actually exercise this power until 1975, and that federal courts in this country have traditionally applied the principle that courts of equity will not, as a general matter, interfere with the debtor’s disposition of his property at the instance of a nonjudgment creditor. We think it incompatible with our traditionally cautious approach to equitable powers, which leaves any substantial expansion of past practice to Congress, to decree the elimination of this significant protection for debtors”. (emphasis added) The United States government had filed an amicus brief arguing that jurisdiction to issue such injunctions should be confirmed, for reasons that included “preserving the attractiveness of the United States as a center for financial transactions”. [10] This statutory revision reflected the position recently adopted by the courts in Barclay-Johnson v Yuill [1980] 1 WLR 1259and in Prince Abdul Rahman bin Turki al Sudairy v Abu-Taha [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 565, expanding the applicability of Mareva injunctions – beyond foreign-based defendants with assets in England – to defendants based in England. The importance of harmonizing the relief available to defendants based in England and those based outside was emphasized by Lord Hailsham in The Siskina. [11] Section 25 was initially adopted to bring the United Kingdom in line with its obligations under the Brussels Convention on the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Since Brexit, the applicable treaty under Article 25 is the Hague Convention on choice of court agreements (2005). [12] [1980] 1 WLR 460. [13] [1992] 1 WLR 231. [14] [1994] QB 366. [16] [1996] AC 284. [17] [2022] 2 WLR 703 at 738-739. [18] Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v. Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003. [19] [2022] CFI 043 (14 September 2022). [20] Article 5(A)(1)(e) of Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004 (now superseded by the 2025 Law) provided that the DIFC Courts had jurisdiction over “any claim or action over which the Courts have jurisdiction in accordance with DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations”. In Nest Investments Nest Investments v Deloitte & Touche [2018] CA 011 it was held that the RDC constituted “DIFC Regulations” capable of conferring jurisdiction. [21] The DIFC Court clarified that it was exercising its injunctive powers in support of the proceedings in the mainland courts, to fill the gap from the mainland “precautionary attachment order” (“PAO”) mechanism, which was inferior to DIFC injunctions because – inter alia – it does not apply to assets outside the jurisdiction of the Dubai Courts, the attachment does not apply to assets beneficially held for the debtor, the debtor may be notified of the proceedings and the threshold to be met is higher than that in the DIFC Courts. [22] [2021] CFI 092. [23] [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023) at [59]. [24] Law No. 12 of 2004 in respect of the Judicial Authority at the Dubai International Financial Centre. [25] DNB Bank ASA v. Gulf Eyadah [2015] DIFC CA 007. [26] [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023) at [71]. [27] [2024] DIFC CA 003 at [154]-[155]. [28] [2024] DIFC CA 003 at [203]. [29] Stephen Gee, Commercial Injunctions, 7th Ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) at [3-001]. Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 16th Ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 2022) at [10-022]. Mercedes Benz v. Leiduck [1996] AC 284 at 300. Fourie v. Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1 at [30]. Broad Idea v. Convoy [2021] UKPC 24 at [121]. [30] Trafigura PTE LTD (1) Trafigura India PTV LTD (2) v Prateek Gupta (1) Ginni Gupta (2) [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025). Note that an initial judgment at the ex parte hearing of the proceedings was anonymized as Nadil (1) Noshaba (2) v (1) Nameer, (2) Naseema (13 June 2025). [31] The ex parte appeal decision is anonymised as Nadil (1) Noshaba (2) v (1) Nameer, (2) Naseema (13 June 2025) [32] [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025). [33] [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025) at [135]. [34] Nadil (1) Noshaba (2) v (1) Nameer (2) Naseema (13 June 2025) at [70]. [35] Trafigura PTE LTD (1) Trafigura India PTV LTD (2) v Prateek Gupta (1) Ginni Gupta (2) [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025). Note that an initial judgment at the ex parte hearing of the proceedings was anonymized as Nadil (1) Noshaba (2) v (1) Nameer, (2) Naseema (13 June 2025). [36] [2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025). [37] [2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025) at [56]. [38] [[2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025) at [58]-[59]. [39] [2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025) at [69]. [40] Olympio v. Olwin [2025] ARB 024 (7 August 2025). See also the corresponding Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal decision (002/2025) dated 2 September 2025. [41] [2025] ENF 185 (25 November 2025). While the judgment has not been published on the DIFC website, the authors have reviewed an anonymized copy. [42] [2025] ENF 185 (25 November 2025) at [21]. [43] Olympio v. Olwin [2025] ARB 024 (7 August 2025). See also the corresponding Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal decision (002/2025) dated 2 September 2025. [44] [2025] ENF 185 (25 November 2025). While the judgment has not been published on the DIFC website, the authors have reviewed an anonymized copy. [45] [2025] DIFC DEC 001 (17 October 2025). [46] Trafigura PTE LTD (1) Trafigura India PTV LTD (2) v Prateek Gupta (1) Ginni Gupta (2) [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025). Note that an initial judgment at the ex parte hearing of the proceedings was anonymized as Nadil (1) Noshaba (2) v (1) Nameer, (2) Naseema (13 June 2025).Conclusion